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Abstract—The widespread deployment of Automatic Metering
Infrastructures in Smart Grid scenarios rises great concerns
about privacy preservation of user-related data, from which
detailed information about customer’s habits and behaviors
can be deduced. Therefore, the users’ individual measurements
should be aggregated before being provided to External Entities
such as utilities, grid managers and third parties.
This paper proposes a security architecture for distributed
aggregation of additive data, in particular energy consumption
metering data, relying on Gateways placed at the customers’
premises, which collect the data generated by local Meters
and provide communication and cryptographic capabilities. The
Gateways communicate with one another and with the External
Entities by means of a public data network. We propose a
secure communication protocol aimed at preventing Gateways
and External Entities from inferring information about individual
data, in which privacy-preserving aggregation is performed by
means of a cryptographic homomorphic scheme. The routing of
information flows can be centralized or it can be performed in
a distributed fashion using a protocol inspired by Chord. We
compare the performance of both approaches to the optimal
solution minimizing the data aggregation delay.
Index Terms—Smart Grid; Multiparty Computation; Data
Privacy;
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy industry is rapidly changing. Smart Grids are
developed by massively integrating Information and Commu-
nication Technology (ICT) into energy grids to ensure security
of supply [1]. The new energy grid will be equipped with
innovative sensing and control systems, capable of performing
real time monitoring of power generation, transmission and
usage, of analyzing consumption data and providing informa-
tion about optimization and forecasting of power utilization
[2]. Moreover, it will allow a consistent reduction of carbon
emissions by integrating Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
and increasing the efficiency of energy utilization [3]. A
pivotal role in Smart Grids is played by Smart Meters and
communication Gateways, which are installed at the cus-
tomer’s premises. A Smart Meter performs measurements of
the energy consumption, of the availability of energy storage
capacity, or of local energy generation and sends these data
via the Gateway to External Entities, e.g., to a metering
operator or a meter service provider, which in turn provide
them to the energy supplier to enable accounting and billing.
Also other entities such as Distribution System Operators
(DSOs) or Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) might be
interested in such data to optimize the distribution network
[4]. The customer’s Gateway does not only send data but
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could also receive data, e.g., pricing information when using
variable tariffs to which it responds accordingly. Thus, the
data of the smart metering system has a certain economic
value, may enable several value added services and can be
accessed by multiple entities. However, security and privacy
are of paramount importance to ensure correct operation and
protection of customers’ personal data: it has been shown (see
e.g.[5], [6]) that customers’ electrical usage readings can be
used to profile their behavior and even to determine which
household appliances are being used. Therefore, through the
analysis of the customers’ electrical load profile, detailed in-
formation about personal habits and lifestyles can be inferred.
The protection of customers’ privacy can be implemented by
means of a security architecture enabling aggregation of the
collected data. If data such as measurements or responses to
pricing information is aggregated over a certain area (e.g., a
network segment) the chance of leaking personal information
(e.g., usage behavior, presence at home) is greatly reduced.
We showed in [7] that data aggregation can be performed
by additional components placed in the domain of the DSO.
However, this solution increases the complexity of the Smart
Grid ecosystem. This paper explores a solution requiring no
additional nodes beyond those already present in the Smart
Grid architecture, with the exception of a Configurator node
responsible of checking the conformance of the monitoring
requests to the Smart Grid privacy policies. The deployment
of the communication flows between the nodes can be done
either by the Configurator or by the Gateways in a distributed
fashion. Data aggregation is performed in a distributed way
by the Gateways, interconnected by means of a peer-to-peer
overlay network: meshed local area networks based on radio-
frequency technologies, which interconnect Gateways in order
to aggregate meter data in a cost-effective way, have already
been field-tested by several public utility companies in the
Netherlands [8]. Adding more functionalities to the Gateway is
in line with recent efforts of numerous standardization bodies,
among others the German Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI), which currently specifies a Protection Profile
(PP) for Smart Grid Gateways [9]. Indeed, considering the low
cost and the constrained computational capabilities of Meters,
the Gateway turns out to be an ideal point to integrate security
mechanisms. The PP defines security mechanisms such as
Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure the communication,
as well as mechanisms to secure the system itself, i.e. by
making it mandatory to include a hardware security module
for the storage of cryptographic keys and the execution of
cryptographic operations. This paper provides the following
novel contributions:
2• the design of a distributed data aggregation architecture
relying on Gateways located at the customers’ premises;
• the proposal and comparison of two secure protocols to
perform privacy-preserving data collection and aggrega-
tion, based on the Shamir Secret Sharing and the Cramer-
Shoup schemes respectively;
• an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation to opti-
mally deploy communication flows assuming centralized
routing and a greedy algorithm to provide sub-optimal
solutions in case of large instances;
• a variant of Chord protocol to perform distributed routing
of information flows;
• a discussion of the security guarantees and the com-
putational complexity of the proposed data aggregation
protocol and numerical results to assess its performance.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an over-
all view of the related work, while Section III introduces some
background knowledge. Section IV describes the proposed
security framework, while the security protocol is presented
in Section V. An ILP formulation and two algorithms for the
deployment of communication flows among the network nodes
are proposed in Section VI. Section VII discusses the security
guarantees provided by the proposed protocol and Section VIII
evaluates its computational complexity and presents numerical
results. The paper is concluded in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Secure data aggregation schemes in the context of Smart
Grids have been investigated by several researchers. The
most common approach relies on MultiParty Computation
(MPC) techniques to perform the collaborative computation
of an aggregation function based on private inputs which are
not disclosed to the participants. In [10], four aggregation
protocols with different cryptographic properties and complex-
ities are described. Papers [11] and [12] propose aggregation
protocols based on the homomorphic Paillier’s cryptosystem:
the latter also introduces a tree-based routing topology for the
aggregation of metering data, involving multiple neighboring
meters. One version of our proposed protocol is based on
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, which derives from Paillier
scheme and maintains its homomorphic properties. The second
version is based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS), which is
computationally less demanding. However, none of the above
mentioned papers explicitly discusses the possibility to extend
the proposed approaches to multiple entities interested in col-
lecting aggregated data, while our solution allows the aggre-
gation of the same data according to multiple rules specifying
different aggregation granularities, with a limited increase in
the volume of exchanged information. Cryptographic schemes
can also be combined with differential privacy techniques
in order to securely compute aggregate statistics: in [13], a
protocol for the distributed generation of random noise is
proposed, aimed at the distributed implementation of privacy-
preserving statistical databases. To do so, the protocol relies on
a verifiable secret sharing scheme. One of our proposed data
aggregation protocol is based on SSS scheme, which does not
provide data integrity verification but is computationally light-
weight. Privacy-preserving aggregation has been studied also
in the context of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) scenarios:
[14] presents a a judgement method based on a trust schema
to detect whether a sensor node has a potential misbehavior,
in order to build a secure in-network aggregation tree. In
[15], an integrity-protecting private data aggregation scheme is
proposed, where privacy is achieved through data slicing and
assembling techniques, while integrity is ensured constructing
disjoint aggregation paths to collect the data. The same au-
thors present, in [16], two schemes for additive aggregation
functions, relying on adaptations of the Shamir Secret Shar-
ing and Secret Splitting schemes, respectively. Both schemes
are well suited for a wireless system supporting broadcast
transmissions. Conversely, our protocol only requires unicast
channels and deals with geographically sparse nodes by using
either centralized routing or a distributed routing based on
the peer-to-peer protocol Chord [17]. Another approach to
ensure secure data distribution is proxy re-encryption, which
allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext computed
under a given public/private key pair into one that can be
decrypted by a different private key, without having access
to the underlying plaintext. Paper [18] explores Identity-
Based proxy re-encryption to delegate decryption rights, while
three different unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes are
proposed in [19], with application to secure distributed storage.
However, only one of the three schemes has homomorphic
properties and thus allows data aggregation.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section we recall some basic notions about two
cryptographic schemes that will be used in our proposed
aggregation protocol.
A. Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme was first proposed in
[20] as a threshold scheme to divide a secret in w parts called
shares. Each share is given to a different participant to the
protocol. To recover the secret, the cooperation of at least
t ≤ w participants is required. The SSS scheme works as
follows: let m ∈ Zq be the secret, where q is a prime number,
greater than all the possible secrets. To split the secret in w
shares, select t− 1 integer random numbers ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρt−1
uniformly distributed in [0, q − 1] and compute the s-th share
(xs, ys), 1 ≤ s ≤ w, where xs are distinct integer numbers
and ys ≡ m + ρ1xs + ρ2x2s + . . . + ρt−1xt−1s mod q. The
secret can be recovered using t or more shares by using the
Lagrange interpolation method.
B. “Lite” Variant of Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem
The “lite” variant of Cramer-Shoup (CS) cryptosystem has
been first described in [21] and works as follows. Select two
large safe prime numbers p and q (i.e. p = 2p′ − 1 and
q = 2q′ − 1, where p′ and q′ are primes). Compute n = pq
and select an element g of order λ(n) = 2p′q′ in Z∗n2 . Note
that such a g can be easily found by selecting a random
number a ∈ Z∗n2 and computing g = −a2n. Then, select a
random integer x ∈ [0, n2/2] and set h = gx mod n2. The
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decryption key is either Dw = x or Ds = (p, q): the first
private key is called weak decryption key, while the second
is the so called strong decryption key. To encrypt a message
m ∈ Zn, select a random number r ∈ [0, n/4] and compute
the ciphertext T1 = gr mod n2, T2 = hr(1 + mn) mod n2.
Decryption via the weak key x is performed by computing
m = L(T2/T
x
1 mod n
2) mod n, where L(u) = u−1n . Con-
versely, if the factorization of n is known, the plaintext can
be obtained by T2 as m = L(T
λ(n)
2 mod n
2)[λ(n)]−1 mod n.
Note that Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is derived from Paillier
cryptosystem [22], which has homomorphic properties with
respect to addition, therefore it can be applied to secure data
aggregation schemes. The authors of [19] propose a modifica-
tion of the above presented scheme, allowing the decryption
to be performed in two steps by two different nodes, which
we will refer to as proxy and recipient: the proxy starts the
decryption procedure, which is completed by the recipient.
Therefore, the collaboration of both nodes is required to
recover the plaintext, which cannot be obtained independently
by a single node. The weak decryption key Dw = x can
be divided in two parts Dw,1 = x1 and Dw,2 = x2 such
that x = x1 + x2: one is given to the proxy, the other to
the recipient. The proxy performs a partial decryption of the
ciphertext via x1 by computing T ′1 = T
x1
1 mod n
2. Then,
the partially decrypted message T ′1 is sent to the recipient
together with T1 and T2 and the decryption is completed by the
recipient via x2 by calculating L(T2/(T x21 T
′
1) mod n
2) mod
n = L(T2/(T
x1+x2
1 ) mod n
2) mod n = m.
IV. OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Aggregation Architecture
Our proposed architecture (cf. Fig. 1) includes three differ-
ent sets of nodes:
• the set of Meters, M, which generate the measurements
of energy consumption, production, and storage of each
customer;
• the set of Gateways, G, which perform data aggregation
directly on the encrypted measurements. The Gateway
receives data from multiple Meters, for example all the
Meters in a building.
• the set of External Entities (EEs), E , which receive
aggregated information and represent the utilities (e.g.
metering service providers) or other third party services,
such as billing companies or energy brokers.
The architecture also includes a Configurator, which receives
the aggregation requests specified by the EEs. It checks
whether the EE is authorized to monitor those Meters and
the granularity of the aggregation conforms to the grid policy.
If the aggregation request is compliant to the system policies,
the Configurator authorizes the aggregation. In case of cen-
tralized routing, the Configurator also has the responsibility of
defining the information flows between Meters, Gateways and
EEs. Note that the Gateway allows the local users to access
their own meter readings, in order to perform monitoring
and optimization of their energy consumption. Conversely,
individual disaggregated data should not be provided to the
Gateways, G 
External Entities, E 
Configurator 
Meters, M 
Fig. 1. The functional nodes of the architecture
EEs, unless they are properly pseudonymized in order to
preserve the customers’ privacy. For a thorough discussion on
the pseudonmization of metering data, the reader is referred to
[23]. Note also that the collection procedure is not influenced
by the type of data to be aggregated, therefore our framework
can be easily integrated with data perturbation and obfuscation
techniques:for example, as proposed in [24], a battery can be
installed at the customer’s premises in order to partially hide
the energy consumption profile, or noise injection could be
performed according to the paradigm of differential privacy
[25], also considering a distributed scenario [26], [13]. Further,
it is worth noting that the Gateways are considered to be
functional nodes and our architecture is agnostic with respect
to their physical location: Meters and Gateways may be
implemented by a single physical device or located indepen-
dently. We assume that each Meter is associated to a single
Gateway, that every EE can communicate to a subset of the
Gateways and that the Gateways are interconnected via a
public data network. Further, we assume that the Meters have
identifiers from which the identifier of the Gateway to which
they are physically connected can be easily inferred, which
can be achieved e.g. by using hierachical identifiers. Since
the computational capabilities of the Gateways are limited,
aggregation must be performed in multiple steps, in order
to prevent the overloading of some Gateways and to equally
distribute the computational burden among them.
B. Problem Definition
In each time period τ ∈ N, each Meter m ∈M generates a
measurement φm(τ), which it sends to its connected Gateway.
Each EE e ∈ E , specifies an aggregation mask Ame, with
Ame = 1 if the EE e wishes to aggregate the data coming
from Meter m and equal to 0 otherwise. At each time interval
τ the EE expects to learn the sum:
Φe(τ) =
M∑
m=1
Ameφm(τ)
For ease of exposition, we will not consider the case of
an EE wishing to aggregate over time, which can be easily
4implemented in the architecture in a way similar to [7]. We
say that the architecture is aggregator oblivious if it satisfies
the following security notions:
1) The EE e cannot distinguish between two different sets
of φm(τ) as long as they are equivalent with respect
to addition. In particular, it cannot learn anything about
any Meter m which is not included in the monitored set
(Ame = 0).
2) If an EE e colludes with a set of Gateways Gc ⊂ G,
it cannot learn anything more than what is implied by
knowledge of the Φe(τ) and φm(τ) for all m locally
connected to a Gateway g ∈ Gc.
3) If a set of EEs Ec colludes, they cannot learn anything
more than what is implied by knowledge of the Φe(τ)
for all e ∈ Ec.
Note that notions (1) and (2) correspond to the definition
of aggregator obliviousness given in [26]. The additional
condition (3) is a necessary addition in our scenario in which
several aggregators have different views of the same data.
Since the Configurator has knowledge of all the aggregation
requests, it can check whether a collusion of EEs can learn too
much and, therefore, can deny the requests. We say that the
architecture is (t, )-blind if it fulfills the following security
notions:
1) Any collusion of t or more Gateways cannot learn
anything about any φm(τ), except for the Meters directly
connected to the Gateways in Gc and a fraction  of the
other Meters.
2) Any collusion of fewer than t Gateways cannot learn
anything about any φm(τ), except for the Meters directly
connected to the Gateways.
We say that the architecture is robust to a collusion of
Gateways and EEs if any collusion of a set of Gateways Gc
and a set of EEs Ec cannot learn anything about the φm(τ)
more than what can be obtained by Gc and Ec separately.
C. Attacker Model
The Gateways and the EEs behave according to the honest-
but-curious security model. They execute the protocol hon-
estly, but keep trace of all their inputs and can execute
any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm in order to infer
additional information about φm(τ). Conversely, the Meters
are considered to be fully trusted. Data pollution attacks
performed by injecting false measurements are out of the
scope of this paper. However, there are some techniques that
can be used to prevent these attacks given knowledge of the
application semantics, for example by using zero knowledge
checks as suggested in [26]. An external passive intruder may
eavesdrop the communication channels. However, we assume
that a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is available and that all
the nodes in the architecture have the necessary certificates for
establishing a confidential channel.
V. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide two versions of a communication
protocol to perform privacy-preserving aggregation of data
Fig. 2. Share collection and aggregation at the Gateway
generated by Smart Meters: the encryption of customers’ data
can performed by means of either (1) Shamir’s Secret Sharing
scheme, or (2) the “Lite” Cramer-Shoup scheme with two-step
decryption procedure proposed in [19]. In Sections VII and
VIII we compare their security properties and performance.
For a discussion on a possible implementation of the protocol,
the reader is referred to [27].
A. Basic Principles
With the SSS scheme, the data generated by each Meter are
divided in w shares and sent to different Gateways. Each share
is identified with a consecutive number s, with 1 ≤ s ≤ w. By
means of the homomorphic properties of the SSS scheme with
respect to addition, the shares generated by different Meters
and characterized by the same number s can be independently
summed by the Gateways, according to the rules specified
by each EE, which have been beforehand received from the
Configurator. These data are sent to other Gateways or to the
EEs themselves, in case the aggregation process is completed.
Finally, the aggregated measurements can be recovered by the
EEs by combining at least t ≤ w aggregated shares, where t
is a design parameter. In order to increase the robustness of
the protocol in case of an unreliable communication network,
the threshold t can be set lower than w. The reader is referred
to [7] for a thorough evaluation of the performance of the
SSS scheme in presence of message losses or node faults
and for a correct dimensioning of the parameters w and t.
Conversely, the CS scheme with two-step decryption divides
the Configurator’s decryption key in two parts: one is given
to the Gateway communicating the aggregated data to the EE,
the other to the EE. The metering data are encrypted using the
Configurator’s public encryption key and aggregated by the
Gateways. When the aggregation process is completed, the
Gateway communicating to the EE operates as a proxy and
performs a partial decryption of the aggregated measurement
using his partial decryption key. Then, the EE recovers the
plaintext by completing the decryption with the second part
of the key. Figure 2 depicts the measurement collection and
aggregation procedure performed at the Gateway. The Gateway
receives as inputs two different types of data: (1) data gath-
ered from the Meters; (2) partially aggregated measurements
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1.SpecifyAggregationRule
Policy check
2.GrantRule
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3a.ConfigureGateway
Fig. 3. Configuration phase of the SSS-based aggregation protocol with
centralized routing
computed by other Gateways. Note that Meter measurements
can include energy consumption, feed in stored or generated
energy, grid data (e.g., voltage, phase angle), forecast data
(e.g., about consumption), and status data (e.g., available
storage capacity, estimated available energy which can be feed
into the grid generated by a solar panel, and so on). Since the
computational capabilities of the Gateways are limited, the
total number of incoming shares (fan-in) at the Gateway is
limited by a threshold. In the protocol, we assume that time
is divided in intervals τ with duration in the order of seconds
or minutes: therefore, all the nodes are required to be loosely
time synchronized. Both versions of the protocol include two
phases: an initial setup phase is performed only once per
EE and can possibly be repeated every time a global re-
keying is required. Then, the second phase is repeated in every
time interval to perform the aggregation of the measurements.
Note that this phase is crucial from the point of view of
computational complexity, since it involves all the nodes in the
network and must ensure the timely collection of aggregated
data and the scalability of the infrastructure even in case of
constrained computational capabilities of some of the nodes.
In particular, our approach is aimed at delegating to the
Gateways most of the computational effort, in order not to
overload the Meters, which usually have limited resources.
Each version supports two alternative schemes for the routing
of information flows. The first scheme relies on centralized
routing, in which the Configurator is responsible for allocating
the data flows. The second scheme uses distributed routing,
where the Gateways route the communication flows using a
variant of the Chord routing protocol. In the remainder of the
section, The Configurator, the Gateways, the Meter and the EE
involved in the communication are identified with the letters
f , i and j, m and e respectively. A list of the main symbols
used throughout the paper is reported in Table I.
B. SSS-based Communication Protocol
1) Configuration Phase: The initial setup phase consists of
the following messages: 1. SpecifyAggregationRule
e→ f : Me
The EE e ∈ E communicates to the Configurator f an
aggregation rule Me, where Me indicates the set of Meters
that the EE wants to monitor. In the remainder of the paper, we
assume that each EE specifies a single aggregation rule. Any-
way, multiple aggregation rules can be modelled by assuming
TABLE I
LIST OF MAIN SYMBOLS
M set of Meters (m ∈M is an element of the set)
G set of Gateways (i ∈ G is an element of the set)
E set of External Entities (e ∈ E is an element of the
set)
f the Configurator
Me set of Meters monitored by External Entity e
w number of shares used in the protocol
t minimum number of shares necessary to recover the
secret using SSS protocol
s share number (1 ≤ s ≤ w)
τ protocol time interval number
Ge set of Gateways involved in the computation of the
aggregated measurements destined to the External
Entity e
IsGe set of Gateways sending to a given Gateway the s-
th partially aggregated share destined to the External
Entity e
OsGe set of Gateways to which a given Gateway must send
the s-th partially aggregated share destined to the
External Entity e
φm(τ) measurement generated by Meter m at the time inter-
val τ
Φe(τ) aggregated measurement expected by the External
Entity e at the time interval τ
σie(τ, s) s-th aggregated share computed at time interval τ by
Gateway i and destined to the External Entity e
Dw,e part of the CS weak decryption key held by the
External Entity e
Dw,g part of the CS weak decryption key held by the tree-
root Gateway
T τ,i1,e , T
τ,i
2,e partially aggregated measurements encrypted with CS
scheme computed by Gateway i and destined to the
External Entity e
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1.SpecifyAggregationRule
Policy check
2.GrantRule
3b.SetupAggregationTree
3b.SetupAggregationTree
Fig. 4. Configuration phase of the SSS-based aggregation protocol with
distributed routing
multiple co-located EEs. 2. GrantRule
f → e : Grantf
The Configurator checks the conformity of the rule specified
by each EE to the security policies of the system. If the request
is accepted, the Configurator sends to the EE a grant ticket
defined as Grantf =Me‖Texp‖sigf (Me‖Texp), where Texp
is the grant expiration time. The ticket is signed with the
signature function sigf using the Configurator’s private signing
key. 3a. ConfigureGateway (for centralized routing, see
Fig. 3)
f → i : s‖IsGe‖OsGe
In case of centralized routing of the information flows, the
Configurator selects the set of Gateways Ge which will be
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5.SendAggregateShare
Wait for T ,
then recover
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Fig. 5. Data aggregation phase of the SSS-based aggregation protocol
involved in the computation of the aggregated shares destined
to the EE e and communicates them the aggregation rule.
The Configurator sends to each Gateway i ∈ Ge the share
number s, together with two lists IsGe and O
s
Ge : I
s
Ge specifies
the identifiers of the Gateways sending the s-th partially
aggregated share to i destined to the EE e; OsGe enumerates
the identifiers of the Gateways to which i must send the s-th
share destined to the EE e after the aggregation procedure. 3b.
SetupTree (for distributed routing, see Fig. 4)
e→ i (or i→ j) : s‖Grantf‖(IDmin, IDmax)
In case of distributed routing, the EE e must contact a number
of randomly chosen Gateways i equal to the number of shares,
w. Each of these Gateways receives a different share number s
indicating that the Gateway will be responsible of aggregating
the s-th set of shares. As will be detailed in Section VI-C,
each Gateway is part of w independent chord rings of the
used chord overlay network, each one responsible of one set of
shares. Together with the Grant, each Gateway receives a pair
of chord identifiers, (IDmin, IDmax), indicating an interval of
chord identifiers that the Gateway is delegated to aggregate.
Each Gateway checks the correctness of the grant by verifying
the Configurator’s signature, and identifies which Meters in
Me are locally connected. Then the Gateway identifies which
other Gateways j ∈ G are responsible (either locally or as
intermediate hops) for the remaining Meters comprised in
the interval (IDmin, IDmax) and forwards them (1) the grant
and (2) a pair of IDs identifying the interval for which
j is responsible. Therefore, the Gateway prepares itself for
aggregating the shares from the local Meters with the partially
aggregated shares arriving from the other Gateways following
the reverse path.
2) Aggregation Phase: Once the deployment of the com-
munication flows is completed, the following messages are
exchanged at the end of each interval (see Fig. 5). Let τ be
the interval number: 4. SendMeasurement
m→ i : τ‖φm(τ)
The measurement φm(τ) generated by Meter m at time
interval τ is sent to the Gateway i connected to the Meter.
At the Gateway, the measurement is divided in w shares. 5.
Configurator, f Meter, m Gateway, i Gateway, j Ext. Entity, e
1.SpecifyAggregationRule
Policy check
2.GrantRule
3b.SetupAggregationTree
3b.SetupAggregationTree
3c.SendTreeRoot
3b.SendKeyShare
Fig. 6. Configuration phase of the CS-based aggregation protocol with
distributed routing
SendAggregateShare
i→ j (or i→ e) : τ‖s‖IDe‖σie(τ, s)
For every aggregation rule communicated by the Configurator,
each Gateway waits for the incoming shares for a given
time T , then, independently of the other Gateways, performs
data aggregation directly on the ciphered shares according to
the considered rule, computing the partially aggregated share
as σie(τ, s) =
∑
k∈Ωi σ
k
e (τ, s), where the set Ωi includes
the Gateways in OsGe and the local Meters involved in the
aggregation rule. The partially aggregated share is then sent
to the next Gateway j ∈ G along the path associated to
the corresponding share number s or, in case the aggregation
procedure is concluded, the final aggregated share is sent to the
EE e, which waits until reception of at least t ≤ w aggregated
shares and then combines them to recover the aggregated data
Φe(τ). The interval number τ and the identity IDe of the EE
e are also included in the message.
C. CS-based Communication Protocol
1) Configuration Phase:
1. SpecifyAggregationRule
e→ f : Me
With reference to Fig. 3, the specification of the aggregation
rule by the EE to the Configurator is unchanged with respect
to Section V-B. 2. GrantRule
f → e : Grantf‖Dw,e
In Message 2., additionally to the Grant, the Configurator
divides its weak decryption secret key Dw in two parts Dw,g =
x1, Dw,e = x2 = x−x1 and communicates the decryption key
part Dw,e to e. Note that x1 is randomly chosen for each EE.
3a. ConfigureGateway (for centralized routing)
f → i : IGe‖OGe or
f → i : IGe‖OGe‖Dw,g (only for aggregation tree root)
As in the SSS-based version of the protocol, the Configurator
selects the set of Gateways Ge which will be involved in the
computation of the aggregated measurement destined to the EE
7e and communicates them the aggregation rule. The Configu-
rator sends to each Gateway i ∈ Ge the two lists IGe and OGe .
In case the Gateway i is responsible for communicating the
aggregated measurement to e, the message also includes the
partial decryption key Dw,g . 3b. SetupTree (for distributed
routing, see Fig. 6)
e→ i (or i→ j) : Grantf‖(IDmin, IDmax)
In case of distributed routing, Message 3b. is the same as
in Section V-B and simply omits the share number s. Once
the EE elects Gateway i as root of the aggregation tree, two
additional messages are required: 3c. SendTreeRoot
e→ f : certi
The EE communicates to the Configurator the certificate of
the selected Gateway i, which includes the Gateway’s identity,
IDi, and public encryption key, pki. The certificate is assumed
to be signed by a trusted certificate authority and can be
recovered either from the Gateway or from a public directory.
3d. SendKeyShare
f → i : Encpki(Dw,g)
The Configurator sends to the aggregation tree root i the
decryption key part Dw,g , encrypted with the Gateway public
key pki. Enc can be any standard asymmetric encryption
algorithm. The Gateway i recovers Dw,g by decrypting it with
its private decryption key.
2) Aggregation Phase: The exchanged messages are anal-
ogous to the ones depicted in Fig. 5, even if their content
partially changes. 4. SendMeasurement
m→ i : τ‖φm(τ)
During the aggregation phase, Message 4. is the same as
in Section V-B. Once the Gateways receive the measure-
ments generated by the Meters, they encrypt them under
the Configurator’s public encryption key Ef = (n, g, h) by
computing T τ,i1,e = g
r mod n2, T τ,i2,e = [h
r(1 + φm(τ)n) mod
n2], where r is an integer random number in [0, n/4]. 5.
SendAggregateShare
i→ j : τ‖IDe‖(T τ,i,tot1,e , T τ,i,tot2,e ) or
i→ e : τ‖IDe‖(T τ,i,tot1,e , T τ,i,tot2,e )‖T τ,i,tot
′
1,e
For every aggregation rule communicated by the Configurator,
each Gateway computes the partially aggregated measurement
as:
T τ,i,tot1,e =
∏
k∈Ωi
T τ,k1,e mod n
2and
T τ,i,tot2,e =
∏
k∈Ωi
T τ,k2,e mod n
2
The partially aggregated measurement is then sent to the
next Gateway j ∈ G along the aggregation path or, in case
the aggregation procedure is concluded, the final aggregated
measurement is partially decrypted by the Gateway elected
as aggregation tree root using the decryption key share Dw,g
by computing T τ,i,tot
′
1,e = (T
τ,i,tot
1,e )
x1 mod n2 and sent to
the EE e, which completes the decryption of the aggregated
measurement via Dw,e by calculating:
Φe(τ) = (L(T
τ,i,tot
2,e /[T
τ,i,tot′
1,e (T
τ,i,tot
1,e )
x2 ]) mod n2) mod n
VI. ROUTING OF THE AGGREGATION TREES
A. Centralized Optimal Solution
In the SSS-based protocol version with centralized routing,
the Configurator can optimally deploy the information flows.
In order to compare the optimal solution to solutions obtained
by means of sub-optimal approaches, we define the following
Integer Linear Programming model. Sets: Meters (M), Gate-
ways (G), External Entities (E), and Shares (S). Parameters:
Ame boolean indicator, it is 1 if Meter m is monitored by
the EE e, 0 otherwise
Γmi boolean indicator, it is 1 if Meter m is connected to
Gateway i, 0 otherwise
Dij time delay to send a share on the communication
channel from Gateway i to Gateway j
∆ie time delay to send a share on the communication
channel from Gateway i to the EE e
Fin maximum number of input shares processable by a
Gateway
Fout maximum number of output shares processable by a
Gateway
Variables:
xijms boolean variable, it is 1 if the share s generated by
Meter m is included in one or more partially aggregate
shares communicated to Gateway j by Gateway i, 0
otherwise
zijmseboolean variable, it is 1 if the share s generated by
Meter m and destined to the EE e is sent by Gateway
i to Gateway j, 0 otherwise
yijes boolean variable, it is 1 if the partially aggregate share
s destined to the EE e is communicated by Gateway i
to Gateway j, 0 otherwise
wies boolean variable, it is 1 if the aggregate share s is sent
to the EE e by Gateway i, 0 otherwise
δ maximum total delay to compute an aggregated mea-
surement
Objective function: min δ (1)
Constraints:∑
i,j∈G : j 6=i
zijmseDij+
∑
i∈G
wies∆ie ≤ δ ∀e ∈ E , s ∈ S,m ∈M (2)
∑
i∈G
wies = 1 ∀e ∈ E , s ∈ S (3)
|M|(ΓmiAme +
∑
j∈G : j 6=i
zjimse) ≥
∑
k∈G : k 6=i
zikmse + w
i
esAme
∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, i ∈ G, e ∈ E
(4)
8ΓmiAme +
∑
j∈G : j 6=i
zjimse ≤ |M|(
∑
k∈G : k 6=i
zikmse + w
i
csAme)
∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, i ∈ G, e ∈ E
(5)
|E|xijms ≥
∑
e∈E
zijmseAme ∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, i, j ∈ G : j 6= i
(6)
xijms ≤
∑
e∈E
zijmseAme ∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, i, j ∈ G : j 6= i (7)
|M|yijes ≥
∑
m∈M
zijmseAme ∀e ∈ E , s ∈ S, i, j ∈ G : j 6= i
(8)∑
s∈S,j∈G : j 6=i
xjims ≤ |S| − 1 ∀m ∈M, i ∈ G : Γmi = 0 (9)
∑
m∈M
Γmi|S|+
∑
e∈E,s∈S,j∈G : j 6=i
yjics ≤ Fin ∀i ∈ G (10)
∑
e∈E,s∈S
wies +
∑
e∈E,s∈S,j∈G : j 6=i
yijes ≤ Fout ∀i ∈ G (11)
The objective function aims at minimizing the maximum delay
required for the computation of the aggregated measurement,
i.e. to collect the |S| shares required to recover the aggregated
data. The variable δ is set to the highest delay required to
perform the aggregation process by Constraint (2). Constraint
(3) guarantees that the EE e receives each of the |S| aggregated
shares. Flow conservation is ensured by Constraints (4) and
(5), while coherence among the values of the variables xijms,
yijes and z
ij
mse is imposed by Constraints (6), (7), and (8).
Constraint (9) ensures that at most |S|−1 shares generated by
a certain Meter are gathered by the same Gateway, in order to
prevent a Gateway from recovering the secret (this constraint
is not applied to the Meters which are directly connected to
the Gateway). Finally, limitations on the maximum number
incoming and outcoming messages for each Gateway are
imposed by Constraints (10) and (11). The problem consists
of ESG+MSG2 +MESG2 + ESG2 + 1 variables and of
ES + 2MSEG + 2MSG2 + ESG2 + MG + 2G + MSE
constraints, where M = |M|, E = |E|, G = |G| and S = |S|.
Note that the same formulation can be applied to the CS-based
protocol version by setting S = 1 and eliminating Constraint
(9).
B. Heuristic Approach
Given the difficulty of optimally allocating the information
flows over the network, we also provide a heuristic algorithm
that has significantly lower complexity and can be executed
on-line. This algorithm, which we call CentralizedRouting (Al-
gorithm 1), does not try to minimize the delay. Nevertheless,
the simulation results discussed in Section VIII show that the
delay is reasonably good and therefore this algorithm is a vi-
able solution for centralized routing. The algorithm is designed
for the SSS encryption scheme. It assumes that the Gateways
are ordered according to their identifier and works as follows.
The fan-in Fi of each Gateway is computed considering the
data received by the local Meters (lines 2-4). Then, for each
share s and EE e, the first Gateway whose fan-in is still
Algorithm 1 The CentralizedRouting heuristic algorithm
1: initialize zijmse, w
i
es, x
ij
ms, y
ij
es, CountSharei, Delaymse
to 0 ∀m ∈M, e ∈ E , s ∈ S, i ∈ G, j ∈ G
2: for all i ∈ G do
3: Fi ←
∑
m∈M ΓmiS
4: end for
5: gcurr ← 1
6: for all s ∈ S do
7: for all e ∈ E do
8: ghead ← gcurr
9: for all m ∈M : Ame = 1 do
10: let i be the Gateway such that Γmi = 1
11: if Fgcurr < Fin or ghead ≤ i ≤ gcurr then
12: if i < ghead or i > gcurr then
13: if yijes = 0, ∀j : ghead ≤ j ≤ gcurr then
14: zigcurrmse ← 1, xigcurrms ← 1, yigcurres ←
1, Fgcurr ← Fgcurr + 1, Delayme ←
Delaymse +Digcurr
15: else
16: g ← min j : ghead ≤ j ≤ gcurr ∧ yijes = 1
17: zigmse ← 1, xigms ← 1, Delaymse ←
Delaymse +Digcurr
18: end if
19: end if
20: if ghead 6= gcurr and i 6= ghead then
21: for all ∀j : ghead < j ≤ gcurr do
22: zj,j−1mse ← 1, xj,j−1ms ← 1, yj,j−1es ← 1,
Delaymse ← Delaymse +Dj,j−1
23: end for
24: end if
25: else
26: gcurr ← gcurr + 1
27: end if
28: end for
29: end for
30: CountSharegcurr ← CountSharegcurr + 1
31: if CountSharegcurr = S − 1 then
32: gcurr ← gcurr + 1
33: end if
34: end for
35: return zijmse,maxm∈M,s∈Se∈E Delaymse
under Fin is selected as head-node ghead to communicate
the aggregate share s to e. The variable gcurr indicates the
Gateway to which the individual shares are currently sent to
be aggregated. Initially, gcurr = ghead (line 8), but if Fgcurr
reaches Fin, (i.e. the if-condition at line 11 is not satisfied)
gcurr is incremented by 1 (line 26) and an aggregation tree
is formed including one or more of the Gateways consecutive
to ghead (according to the initial ordering). For each Meter m
monitored by e, the s-th individual share generated by m must
be sent from the associated Gateway i to ghead: if m is not
locally connected to any of the Gateways already being part
of the aggregation tree (which satisfies the if-condition at line
11), then the individual share s generated by Meter m is sent
to gcurr, whose current fan-in is incremented by 1, and the
9routing variables z and x are updated accordingly. Moreover,
in case the s-th partially aggregated share is not already
flowing from the local Gateway i to any of the Gateways
comprised between ghead and gcurr, it is sent to gcurr by
updating the variable y and the aggregation delay is increased
accordingly (lines 13-19). In case gcurr 6= ghead, a partially
aggregated share containing the individual share of m is sent
from gcurr to ghead (lines 20-23). Finally, line 31-33 verify
that the number of distinct shares passing through gcurr does
not exceed S − 1, otherwise gcurr is incremented by 1 to
prevent a single Gateway from collecting all the S shares,
which would enable it to recover the individual measurements.
The complexity of the algorithm is O(MSEG). Note that the
algorithm is applicable also to the proxy re-encryption variant
of the communication protocol by setting S = 1 and executing
line 32 regardless to the if-condition at line 31.
C. Distributed Routing Algorithm
The centralized approaches discussed in Sections VI-A and
VI-B require the Configurator to be involved in the allocation
of the information flows and to send a ConfigureGateway
message to each Gateway in the aggregation tree. This is
undesirable because it requires that the Configurator knows
the full network topology, which may be large and expensive
to keep up-to-date. Therefore, we present a fully distributed
routing algorithm (named ChordRouting) in which no node
has knowledge of the full topology. In this algorithm the
Configurator only communicates with the EE providing it
a grant. The EE then uses the grant with the Gateways to
prove that the aggregation rule has been authorized. The
routing algorithm is based on Chord [17] and requires that
all the Gateways share a family of independent hash functions
hs(·). Each Gateway hashes its ID w times using the hash
functions h1 to hw, thus obtaining w independent chord
identifiers. Then, the Gateways organize themselves in w
independent rings according to the standard Chord rules. Each
ring is responsible of routing a set of shares: the first ring is
responsible for the shares having s = 1, and so on. For each
ring, the EE sends to a random Gateway the grant along with
the ring number (SetupTree protocol message). In order to
avoid that a single Gateway recovers the measurements, the EE
should choose a different Gateway for each ring. We describe
the algorithm with reference to the generic s-th ring. In case
the SSS scheme is used, the operations must be repeated for
all the w rings, while in case of the CS scheme w is set to 1.
The Gateway that receives the grant from the EE checks its
validity and expiration time by verifying the Configurator’s
signature. As discussed in Section V, for the non-local meters
the Gateway identifies the relevant next-hops resulting from
the finger table for the s-th ring and sends them a SetupTree
protocol message. This algorithm does not prevent a single
Gateway from collecting all the w shares of the same Meter.
Fortunately, the likelihood of this event can be reduced by
increasing the number of shares. Since the number of shares
increases the computational effort on the Gateways and the
number of messages, a trade-off must be found. in Section
VIII, we discuss the security and the performance of this
algorithm comparing it to the centralized solutions.
VII. SECURITY DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the security guarantees provided
by our proposed protocol.
A. SSS-based Protocol
Independently of the routing scheme, the network of Gate-
ways delivers to the EE e only the shares σe(τ, s), which
can be recombined to obtain the desired Φe(τ). Recombining
shares from different EEs yields no information, since using
shares destined to distinct EEs as input to the lagrange inter-
polation algorithm would not lead to any meaningful result.
Therefore, the SSS-based protocol is aggregator oblivious.
Regarding blindness in the optimal routing scheme, Constraint
(9) guarantees that a given Gateway cannot collect more than
a given number of shares from a given Meter. For the sake of
simplicity, we have assumed t = w and chosen this threshold
equal to t− 1. Therefore the resulting network is (1, 0)-blind,
meaning that no single Gateway can obtain information on any
Meter that is not directly connected. The same considerations
hold for the centralized greedy algorithm, where the threshold
can be modified at line 31. However, modifying the threshold
can strengthen the blindness of the system: for example,
setting the threshold to 1 would lead to a (t − 1, 0)-blind
system. In the peer-to-peer routing scheme, no deterministic
guarantees can be given about blindness. Nevertheless, it
must be observed that, in the honest-but-curious model, the
Gateways cannot alter the routing of the aggregation trees,
therefore the collection of all the shares can happen only by
chance. Thus, we state the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Let L be the average path length between a
Meter and the Gateway that performs the final aggregation and
ψ be the probability of a given Meter to be monitored by an
EE. Assuming that the model for the choice of the Gateways
forming each aggregation tree is an independent and random
selection with equal likelihood, which well approximates the
Chord-based routing mechanism, the SSS protocol is (1, )-
blind, where  = 1−
[
1−
(
1− (1− ψL/G)E
)t]G−1
.
Proof: The probability that the s-th share of the mea-
surement φm(τ) generated by Meter m and destined to the
EE e passes through a given Gateway i, given that e actually
monitors m, is L/G. Considering that e monitors m with
probability ψ, the joint probability PJ that e monitors m and
that the s-th share of φm(τ) destined to e passes through i is
PJ = ψL/G. Considering the presence of multiple EEs, the
probability PM that none of the s-th shares of φm(τ) passes
through i is:
PM = (1− PJ)E = (1− ψL/G)E
Therefore, the probability PT that i is part of the aggregation
trees of all the t shares (1 ≤ s ≤ t) generated by m for at
least one of the EEs is:
PT = (1− PM )t =
(
1− (1− ψL/G)E
)t
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Consequently, the probability PG that none of the Gateways
receives all the t shares of φm(τ) is:
PG = 1−(1− PT )G−1 = 1−
[
1−
(
1− (1− ψL/G)E
)t]G−1
(12)
Note that, in the above calculations, we have excluded the
Gateway locally connected to the Meter m. Therefore, as
long as ψL/G < 1, the fraction of compromised Meters
decreases exponentially fast as t increases. Since 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1
by definition and it is known that in Chord L ∼ O(logG),
the above condition is verified except when G is very small.
Moreover, it is worth noting that Theorem 1 does not consider
that even if a Gateway receives all the shares coming from a
given Meter, they can be partly aggregated with a different set
of other Meters from share to share, resulting in the Gateway
having access to a set of incompatible and useless set of shares.
Therefore, Eq. (12) greatly overestimates the actual number
of compromised Meters. In Section VIII, the bounds given by
Theorem 1 are compared to results obtained through numerical
simulations. Finally, regarding the robustness to collusion of
Gateways and EEs, additional information can be obtained
only if the colluded Gateways know the t partially aggre-
gated shares necessary to recover the aggregated measurement
Φ′e(τ) of a subset M′e ⊆ Me. In this case, the aggregated
measurement of the subset Me \ M′e can be computed as
Φe(τ) − Φ′e(τ), where Φ′e(τ) =
∑
m∈M′e φm(τ). However,
the probability that such event happens is even lower than
the probability of recombining a generic partially aggregated
measurement, since it is necessary that the aggregated mea-
surement recovered by the colluded Gateways is generated by
a subset of the Meters monitored by the colluding EE.
B. CS-based Protocol
Independently of the routing scheme, the network of Gate-
ways delivers to the EE e only Φe(τ), partly decrypted. There-
fore the protocol is aggregator oblivious. Before forwarding
the measurements φm(τ) of the local Meters, the Gateway
encrypts them with the CS cryptosystem, which is semantically
secure. Therefore, no collusion of Gateways can recover
information about the individual measurements of the Meters
that are not directly connected. Therefore, independently of
the routing scheme, the protocol is (G, 0)-blind. Moreover,
the protocol is robust with respect to collusions between an
EE and the Gateways, with the only exception of the Gateway
holding one of the parts of the decryption key (i.e. the root of
the aggregation tree), since in this case it can be recombined
with the part held by the EE, thus recovering the system’s
decryption key and making it possible to decrypt all the
measurements destined to the EE. Considering that the tree-
head is randomly chosen, the probability that the tree-head is
part of the set of colluded Gateways Gc is |Gc|/G. Therefore,
the probability that the system is robust to collusion of Gc
Gateways and Ec EEs is
(
1− |Gc|G
)|Ec|
. Table II compares the
above discussed results for both schemes.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we discuss the details of the implemen-
tation of the two versions of the proposed communication
protocol, evaluate their computational complexity in terms
of message sizes, number of operations per message and
number of exchanged messages and compare the experimental
results provided by the CentralizedRouting and ChordRouting
algorithms to the optimal solutions obtained by solving the
ILP formulation with the CPLEX solver.
A. Complexity Evaluation of the Encryption Techniques
We consider 128-bits long identifiers, 32-bits long measure-
ments, and a 32-bits long interval number τ . For the SSS-
based version, we assume that the prime number q is 64 bits
long, which ensures q > t and allows a maximum value of
the aggregated measurement in the order of 1019. Therefore,
the size of the s-th share (xs, ys) is two times the size of
the modulus q. We also assume that the share number s is
8 bits long. It is worth noting that the powers of xi can
be precomputed and have no computational cost during the
measurement phase. For the CS-based version, we set the
length of the modulus n to 1024 bits. Therefore, the two
parts Dw,e, Dw,g of the decryption key Dw ∈ [0, n2] are
each 2048 bits long, and both encryptions T1, T2 ∈ [0, n2]
have length of 2048 bits. Note that the inverse of n required
in the decryption procedure can be precomputed. Table III
compares the computations required to generate each message
during the data aggregation phase in the SSS-based and CS-
based protocol versions. Results show that the computational
complexity of CS scheme is always higher, since it is dom-
inated by the cost of exponentiations modulus n2, while the
complexity of the SSS scheme is dominated by the cost of
multiplications modulus q. The asymptotic number of input
and output messages at each node during the data aggregation
phase is shown in Table IV. The SSS scheme requires more
messages than the CS scheme, due to the splitting of the
measurements. However, in the SSS-based protocol, the mes-
sage size of the single SendAggregateShare message is
l(τ)+l(s)+l(IDe)+l(σ
τ
e (s)) = 32+8+128+128 = 296 bits
(where l(x) is the length in bits of x), which is significantly
smaller than in the CS-based protocol, where the correspond-
ing length is l(τ) + l(IDe) + l((T
τ,tot
1,e , T
τ,tot
2,e )) = 32 + 128 +
2048 + 2048 = 4256 bits for intermediate aggregations and
l(τ) + l(IDe) + l((T
τ,tot
1,e , T
τ,tot
2,e )) + l(T
τ,tot′
1,e ) = 32 + 128 +
2048 + 2048 + 2048 = 6304 bits for the final aggregate mea-
surement. In order to compare the computational complexity of
the different aggregation schemes, we implemented them using
the Sage mathematical software [28]. The computational time
required to perform the encryption/decryption and aggregation
operations are reported in Table V. Measurements have been
performed using an Intel Xeon CPU model E5335 running at
2.00 GHz. Note that the reported results are referred to the
processing of a single measurement. The CS scheme turns
out to be computationally more demanding in all phases: the
measurement encryption and decryption are in the order of
tenths of milliseconds, while the corresponding operations of
the SSS scheme require hundreds of microseconds. Also the
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY PROPERTIES OF THE PROTOCOLS
SSS-based Protocol CS-based Protocol
Aggregator Oblivious 3 3
Blindness
Centralized routing:
(1, 0)
Distributed routing:(
1, 1−
[
1−
(
1− (1− ψL/G)E
)t]G−1) (G, 0)
Robustness to EE-G
collusion With high probability With probability
(
1− |Gc|
G
)|Ec|
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF THE COMPUTATIONAL LOAD AT EACH NODE IN THE AGGREGATION PHASE OF SSS-BASED AND CS-BASED COMMUNICATION
PROTOCOLS
SSS-based Protocol CS-based Protocol
Meter measurement generation measurement generation
Gateway
share computation: |Leg |w(t − 1)Cs(q) + |Leg |w(t − 1)Cm(q) +
|Leg |(t− 1)Cr(q)
measurement encryption: |Leg |(2Ce(n2) + Cm(n2) + Cr(n/4))
share aggregation: (|IsGe |+ |Leg |)Cs(q) measurement aggregation: (|IsGe |+ |Leg |)Cm(n2)
partial decryption:(only for tree roots) Ce(n2)
EE Lagrange interpolation: O(t2) 2Ce(n2) + 2Cm(n2) + Cm(n) + Cs(n)
Cs(x)= cost of a sum modulus x, Cm(x)= cost of a multiplication modulus x, Ce(x)= cost of an exponentiation modulus x, Cr(x)= cost of the
generation of a random number modulus x
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THE ASYMPTOTIC NUMBER OF EXCHANGED MESSAGES PER INTERVAL IN THE AGGREGATION PHASE OF SSS-BASED AND CS-BASED
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
SSS-based Protocol CS-based Protocol
Node Input Output Input Output
Meter - O(1) - O(1)
Gateway O(M/G) +O(ES logG) O(ES) O(M/G) +O(E logG) O(E)
EE O(S) - O(1) -
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL TIMES OF SSS-BASED AND CS-BASED
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS, ASSUMING t = w = 3
Operation SSS-based Protocol CS-based Protocol
Encryption 105 µs 10,3ms
Aggregation 7,81 µs 21,1 µs
Partial Decryption - 10,1ms
Decryption 560 µs 10,2ms
aggregation procedure requires more time in the CS scheme
than in the SSS scheme (21,1 µs vs 7,8 µs).
B. Performance Evaluation of the Routing Algorithms
We now compare the performance of the two heuristic
algorithms with respect to the ILP formulation: all the results
have been averaged over a set of 10 instances of the problem.
For each instance, the parameter Ame has been randomly
computed as a Bernoulli trial with success probability ψ = 0.5.
If not stated otherwise, the number of shares t is set to 3
and it is assumed that t = w. The average communication
delays associated to each communication channel have been
estimated assuming a delay representative of three different
communication technologies: power lines (3 s [29]), broad-
band residential access, e.g. DSL plus a Wi-Fi router (1 s [30]),
and the GPRS (0.3 s [30]) wireless channel. For each Gateway,
the type of channel has been randomly selected, assuming
that the three different technologies are equally likely. Table
VI compares the performance of the CentralizedRouting and
ChordRouting algorithms with respect to the optimal solutions.
Results show that the gap between the maximum delay pro-
vided by the CentralizedRouting algorithm and the optimal
solutions is around 22%, while for the ChordRouting algorithm
is much higher (78%). A comparison is possible only for
small instances, since the computational time required by the
ILP model is extremely high. Conversely, the running time
of our implementation of the CentralizedRouting algorithm is
significantly shorter than the time required by the ILP solver.
Therefore, it is scalable to realistic scenarios with thousands of
Meters monitored by numerous EEs. Fig. 7 depicts the feasibil-
ity regions of the CentralizedRouting Algorithm as a function
of the number of Gateways and EEs, by plotting the minimum
value of the fan-in guaranteeing that the algorithm provides a
feasible solution for more than 50% of the tested instances.
There is a clear evidence that Fin decreases when the number
of Gateways increases, because, with more Gateways, the load
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TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF OPTIMAL (ILP) ROUTING, CentralizedRouting HEURISTIC
ALGORITHM, AND ChordRouting DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
Algorithm Average
Max Delay
Average
Time
Average
Gap
Max
Gap
Min
Gap
ILP 4.4 s 6.4 min – – –
CentralizedR. 5.3 s 1.7 ms 22.2% 62.8% 0%
ChordR. 7.9 s N/A 78% 172% 40%
Results with E = 5, M = 20, G = 5, Fin = 100
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Fig. 7. Minimum Gateway fan-in to guarantee that the heuristic algorithms
provide a feasible solution for more than 50% of the instances, assuming
M=5000. The precision of the confidence intervals (omitted in the plot) is
below 10%.
is more balanced, while the total traffic increase is negligible.
Therefore, we can conclude that the CentralizedRouting Al-
gorithm is effective in providing a feasible solution in a short
computational time and in avoiding the overdimensioning of
the computational resources of the Gateways. Fig. 8 compares
the average delay required to compute an aggregated share
as a function of the fan-in threshold for different values of
G with the CentralizedRouting algorithm. The aggregation
delay decreases for increasing values of Fin, showing that
better performance can be achieved by improving the compu-
tational capabilities of the Gateways. Conversely, increasing
the amount of Gateways leads to a growth of the aggregation
delay, since the aggregation procedure usually requires more
intermediate steps. The influence of the number of EEs is
negligible. Finally, Table VII shows the performance of the
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Fig. 8. Maximum delay required to compute an aggregated measurement,
assuming M=5000 and E=20. The precision of the confidence intervals
(omitted in the plot) is below 10%.
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE OF THE ChordRouting PROTOCOL
Number of
Shares
Analytical Upper
Bound from
Theorem 1
Average Number
of Compromised
Meters
Max.
Fan In
3 64.91% 34.36% 314.8
4 16.61% 5.70% 381.4
5 3.11% 0.89% 449.5
6 0.55% 0.14% 509.4
7 0.095% 0.011% 562.5
8 0.017% 0.0036% 627.1
9 0.0029% <0.0002% 684.9
10 0.0005% <0.0002% 750.2
Results with M = 5000, G = 200 and E = 20, averaged over 100
instances.
ChordRouting Algorithm in terms of the maximum fan-in of
the Gateways and the percentage of compromised Meters,
reporting the percentage of Meters for which at least one
Gateway (with the exclusion the associated Gateway) collects
all the t shares or t partially aggregated shares including the
Meter’s measurements. Though this estimate is tighter than
the estimate in Theorem 1, it is still an upper bound, since the
shares can be incompatible and not necessarily leading to the
recovery of the customer’s data. Results are compared to the
upper bounds provided by Theorem 1: the fraction of possibly
compromised Meters decreases as the number of shares used
in the SSS scheme becomes higher: therefore, the choice of the
system parameter t determines the level of security achievable
by the privacy-preserving protocol. The number of shares t
also influences the computational capabilities required at the
Gateways to run the protocol, since the maximum fan-in grows
when t increases.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a security architecture and a com-
munication protocol for the privacy-friendly distributed com-
putation of aggregated measurements generated by Smart
Meters, which are destined to External Entities such as util-
ities and third parties. The architecture relies on Gateway
nodes, which are located at the customer’s households and
perform collection and processing of the data gathered by
the local Meters, also providing communication and security
capabilities. This paper also provides an optimal centralize
algorithm, a heuristic centralized algorithm, and a distributed
algorithm for the routing of the information flows. Simulations
show that a protocol based on the Shamir Secret Sharing
encryption scheme is a viable solution to the problem of
privacy-preserving aggregation of metering data and that the
distributed routing algorithms are scalable, with a limited
increase of the aggregation delay over the optimal solution
and maintaining strong privacy properties.
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